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Abstract: Ibn Khaldūn’s societal and political theory, benefiting from the “filters of critique” of 
thinkers such as Ghazālī and Fahruddīn al-Razī, is a masterful application in the field of societal 
existence of Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics. From this point of view we can discuss the indispensable 
assumptions of a societal and political theory that can be produced today from classical Islamic 
thought through Ibn Khaldūn’s theory of kingship (henceforth: mulk). With this goal I will discuss in 
the next paragraphs, after analyzing Ibn Khaldūn’s theory of mulk in the context of its own 
philosophy, this theory’s metaphysical assumptions. Ibn Khaldūn is in various ways one of the Islamic 
thinkers that is most studied in academia in contemporary times. Many researchers have written 
books and articles about his views on various fields, such as philosophy, politics, society, economics, 
and history of science.1 From amongst them are authors such as Muhsin Mahdi, Ahmet Arslan, Ali al-
Wardī, and Tahsin Görgün who have aimed to lay bare the philosophical foundations of Ibn Khaldūn’s 
societal and political thought in particular, by establishing relations with philosophers such as 
Aristotle, Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, and Fahruddīn al-Razī. Some writers, such as Syed Farid Alatas, Abdulaziz 
Elazmeh, M. Umer Chapra, Laroussi Amri, Johann P. Arnason, Dieter Weiss, Recep Şentürk, and again 
Tahsin Görgün discuss the timeliness and reproducibility of Ibn Khaldūn’s theories of the state and 
society. From amongst these especially Syed Farid Alatas’ economic and political analysis of Islam in 
general and Asian societies in particular and Recep Senturk’s alternative sociology of civilizations, 
attempting to draw on the thought of Ibn Khaldūn, are worthy of mentioning2. To these names we 
can add those writers who compare the views of Ibn Khaldūn with the views of contemporary social 
and political thinkers such as Karl Marx and Max Weber.3 As especially Muhsin Mahdi and Tahsin 
                                                 
* This article is a review of the paper presented at the ”2nd International Ibn Khaldun Symposium“ organized 
on 29-31 May 2009 in Istanbul. 
1 For a short overview of these studies, see Cengiz Tomar, “İbn Haldûn, Literatür”, TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, 
XX, 8-12. 
2 See Syed Farid Alatas, “A Khaldūnian Exemplar fo a Historical Sociology for the South”, Current Sociology, 
2006, Vol. 54 (3), p. 397-411; “A Khaldūnian Perspective on the Dynamics of Asiatic Societies”, Comporative 
Civilizations Review, 29, p. 29–51. 
3 For a study including the articles on the timeliness of Ibn Khaldun by Muhammad Dhaouadi, Recep Şentürk, 
Syed Farid Alatas, Faruk Yaslıçimen, Lütfi Sunar, Tahsin Görgün and M. Umer Chapra., see İslam Araştırmaları 
Dergisi İbn Haldûn Özel Sayısı II, 16 [2006). 
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Görgün have stressed, the philosophical theories described in works of Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā and 
Fahruddīn al-Razī do not merely for Ibn Khaldūn function as a means or tool to express his own 
views, on the contrary, they form the very foundation of his societal and political theory.4 Ibn 
Khaldūn’s societal and political theory then, benefiting from the “filters of critique” of thinkers such 
as Ghazālī and Fahruddīn al-Razī, is a masterful application in the field of societal existence of Ibn 
Sīnā’s metaphysics. From this point of view we can discuss the indispensable assumptions of a 
societal and political theory that can be produced today from classical Islamic thought through Ibn 
Khaldūn’s theory of kingship (henceforth: mulk). With this goal I will discuss in the next paragraphs, 
after analyzing Ibn Khaldūn’s theory of mulk in the context of its own philosophy, this theory’s 
metaphysical assumptions. 
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Öz: İbn Haldun çağdaş dönemde çeşitli yönleriyle en çok akademik çalışmaya konu olan İslam 
düşünürlerinden biridir. Birçok araştırmacı, onun felsefe, siyaset, toplum, ekonomi ve ilimler tarihi 
gibi çeşitli alanlara dair görüşleri hakkında kitap ve makale seviyesinde çalışmalar kaleme almıştır. 
Bunlar arasında Muhsin Mehdi, Ahmet Arslan, Ali el-Verdî, Tahsin Görgün gibi yazarlar İbn 
Haldun’un bilhassa toplum ve siyaset düşüncesinin felsefi temellerini –Aristoteles, Fârâbî, İbn Sînâ 
ve Fahreddîn el-Râzî gibi filozoflarla ilişkisini kurarak- ortaya koymayı amaçlar. Syed Farid Alatas, 
Abdulaziz Elazmeh, M. Umer Chapra, Laroussi Amri, Johann P. Arnason, Dieter Weiss, Recep 
Şentürk ve yine Tahsin Görgün gibi bir kısım yazarlar İbn Haldun’un devlet ve toplum teorilerinin 
güncelliğini ve yeniden üretilebilirliğini tartışırlar. Bunlar arasında özelikle Syed Farid Alatas’ın 
genelde İslam ve özelde Asya toplumlarının ekonomik ve siyasi çözümlemesi için ve Recep 
Şentürk’ün alternatif bir medeniyetler sosyolojisi için İbn Haldun düşüncesine müracaat çabaları 
zikre şayandır. Bu isimlere, İbn Haldun’un görüşlerini Karl Marx ve M. Weber gibi çağdaş toplum. ve 
siyaset düşüncesinin öncülerinin görüşleriyle karşılaştıran yazarları ilave edebiliriz. Bilhassa Muhsin 
Mehdi ve Tahsin Görgün’ün vurguladığı gibi Fârâbî, İbn Sînâ ve Fahreddîn Râzî’nin eserlerinde dile 
geldiği haliyle felsefî teoriler, İbn Haldun için sadece kendi görüşlerini ifade edebileceği bir vasat 
veya malzeme işlevi görmez, aksine onun toplum ve siyaset teorisinin zeminini oluşturur. Zira İbn 
Haldun’un toplum ve siyaset teorisi, Gazzâlî ve Fahreddîn Râzî gibi düşünürlerden istifadeyle 
“eleştiri süzgecinden geçilmiş” İbn Sînâ metafiziğinin toplumsal varlık alanına ustalıklı bir tatbikidir. 
Bu bakımdan bugün klasik İslam düşüncesinden üretilebilecek bir toplum ve siyaset teorisinin 
vazgeçilmez varsayımlarını İbn Haldun’un mülk teorisi üzerinden tartışabiliriz. Bu amaçla ilerleyen 
satırlarda İbn Haldun’un mülk teorisini kendi felsefî bağlamına atıfla tahlil ettikten sonra bu 
teorinin metafizik varsayımlarını tartışacağım. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: İbn Haldun, Mülk Teorisi, Metafizik, İslam Felsefesi 
 
                                                 
4 See Muhsin Mahdi, Ibn Khaldûn’s Philosophy of History, Chicago : The University of Chicago, 1964, p. 63-
131; Ahmet Arslan, İbn Haldûn’un İlim ve Fikir Dünyası, Ankara: Vadi Yayınları, 1997, p. 437-452; Tahsin 
Görgün, “İbn Haldûn, Görüşleri”, TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, XIX, 543-55. 
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A. Mülk Teorisi 
Ibn Khaldūn constructs his societal theory on a set of concepts such as barbarism 
(bedâvat), civilization (hadârat), group solidarity (asabiyyah), mulk and state (dawlah). 
This construction, as he himself also pointed out, aims to create a philosophical 
science that takes as a subject the society and in that way determines universal laws 
through which societal events can be analyzed in a correct and comprehensive way. To 
achieve this purpose Ibn Khaldūn uses the peripatetic substance-form theory (madde-
sûrah). The main reason for using this theory is to be able to identify the obligatory 
and possible situations defined not at the rational level but at the material level. 
Because of this reason the definer of the individual common nature of the human 
being who is actor in society, in other words setting off from the unchanging 
characteristics through the material necessity, tries to reach the mandatory 
consequences of human nature. To be able to track this nature’s necessities he once 
more takes as a foundation the definition of the peripatetic philosophers. According to 
this view the human being is a “thinking animal”. The term “animal” in the definition is 
the genus that is near to the human being; as for the term “thinking” it is the 
characteristic that distinguishes him from the other animals in the same genus. From 
the viewpoint of being human both characteristics are human characteristics, and 
therefore they do not change according to conditions such as individual, society, place, 
and time. So when Ibn Khaldūn speaks of human nature he basically means the human 
essence that is made up of the characteristics of life and thinking. This nature or 
essence, because of its animality, has characteristics that are common to all animals. 
First of these characteristics are the characteristics of feeding and protection to ensure 
the continuation of existence. However while the necessity of nutrition is a direct need 
of the animal, the necessity of defense arises as a result of the need for aggression 
that is a direct need of the animal. Ibn Khaldūn identifies these two characteristics as 
the final cause (gâî illeti) of the societies that are formed by human beings. That is to 
say, when he mentions “the need for nutrition and defense is the cause of the 
formation of human communities” he means that these two situations are the purpose 
(gaye nedeni) of society. For this aim people come together and amongst individuals 
“cohesion” takes place. Thus, civilization (umrân) is the general name for societies in 
which people come together and form a cohesion. 
 
When the need for nutrition and defense is satisfied, because it is a recurring need and 
therefore continuously occurs, the fulfillment of other particular needs, always makes 
human beings seek a societal existence. With this understanding, living in society is a 
natural characteristic of human beings and this is what is meant by “the human being 
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in its nature is civilized (medenî)”. That society is natural means at the same time that 
it is necessary for mankind. However this necessity does not require that his existence 
continues by itself without needing anything additional. 
 
For the continuation of the societal existence another element is necessary to provide 
cohesion between individuals, namely what Ibn Khaldūn has called asabiyyah. In its 
broadest sense understood as “the spirit of solidarity”,asabiyyah essentially makes 
protection and defense possible through organized power. The function of asabiyyah 
becomes clear when considering the situation of attack which brings about the need 
for defense. Attacking or attempting to take what is possessed by someone else 
(mutâlebe), although it leads to a human situation we call defense and in that way it is 
one of the reasons why a society comes into existence, it is not one of the situations 
that continues its existence by changing into something else. And for this reason 
attack or mutâlebe takes place in any human society as a derivative of protection and 
defense. This means that a group of people who come together to protect themselves 
from external attacks at the same time always possess the power to attack outwardly. 
Attack and defense situations on the other hand are not only situations that can be 
taken into account when considered at the societal level, but only when they are 
outward-looking, that is to say when two or more societies are assumed. On the 
contrary, like with nourishment attack and defense are realized by individual human 
beings, therefore these are situations realized within the society rather than amongst 
societies. And this thus means that the direct consequences of the characteristics of 
nourishment and attack in fact take place within the society itself. With this reason, 
resulting from the need of nourishment, arts, crafts, and various ways of livelihood, 
and resulting from the characteristic of attack and the need for protection, arms 
industry and armament come to existence. Thus asabiyyah basically is a conventional 
meaning that does not operationalize the defense and attack powers individually - 
because the need for defense cannot be met by individual arming - but it does on a 
societal level. 
 
Ibn Khaldūn compares society and asabiyyah with the disposition of natural objects. In 
order to form the disposition of natural objects, one of the elements that come 
together to form the disposition must overweigh the rest; because when all elements 
are equal the unity of the disposition cannot be provided. As such, with asabiyyah it is 
necessary that to form a truly unified society one of the human elements of a part of 
them must overweigh the rest (ghalabah).5 Even if it seems in the first instance that the 
                                                 
5 Ibn Khaldûn, Muqaddimah,. Derviş el-Cüveydî (Beirut: el-Mektebetü’l-Asriyye, 1996), p. 124. 
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relationship between ghalabah and asabiyyah is a mutual necessity (telâzum), in reality 
asabiyyah as such gives priority to ghalabah and it becomes clear that it is the concrete 
cause for ghalabah. For this reason, while asabiyyah has the forming function 
regarding human societies, with regards to ghalabah it has a concrete function, and a 
society that became clear through asabiyyah becomes more clear through the form of 
ghalabah. From this perspective, ghalabah makes asabiyyah in Ibn Khaldūn’s thought a 
political concept and transforms it from a societal theory into a political theory. 
Because a chairman (riyasah) that combines sovereignty (hâkimiyyah) and leadership - 
Ibn Khaldūn sometimes calls this suûdet - can only be formed with ghalabah.6 
 
The basic function of riyasah is to control the power of attack and outburst and to 
manage the community - to distinguish this from previous levels we can call it society 
- which is now closer to real unity in the direction of certain goals. However Ibn 
Khaldūn uses the term leader (reis) to mean a ruler who has no sanction power. 
According to this a leader has follower, but has no power to force his demands. With 
this, leadership is the position in which ghalabah occurs and in this state carries an 
incomplete sovereignty. In other words, riyasah points out a leadership situation that is 
not fully realized by all its necessities. When you add to riyasah the application 
demands by force then you get the thing we call mulk. Therefore while leadership 
(riyasah) corresponds to the substance of the nature of mulk that is common amongst 
all rulers, the meaning of “have something done by force” falls under mulk. Mulk, then, 
is in general a somewhat more specialized and distinctive form of leadership. And so 
Ibn Khaldūn uses mulk in the meaning of “an authority that, in order to completely meet 
the need of defense, prevents the excesses of people against each other, has ghalabah 
over the people, and has the force and sanction power” 
. 7(ﻙﻠﻣﻟﺍ ﻰﻧﻌﻣ ﻭﻫ ﺍﺫﻫﻭ ﻥﺍﻭﺩﻌﺑ ﻩﺭﻳﻏ ﻰﻟﺇ ﺩﺣﺃ ﻝﺻﻳ ﻻ ﻰﺗﺣ ﺓﺭﻫﺎﻘﻟﺍ ﺩﻳﻟﺍﻭ ﻥﺎﻁﻠﺳﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﺑﻠﻐﻟﺍ ﻡﻬﻳﻠﻋ ﻪﻟ ﻥﻭﻛﻳ ﻡﻬﻧﻣ ًﺍﺩﺣﺍﻭ ﻉﺯﺍﻭﻟﺍ ﻙﻟﺫ ﻥﻭﻛﻳﻓ ) 
Since the source of existence of this authority is human wrath and 
because of that the power of attack, the basic function is “to prevent the 
people’s excess against each other”. For this function a force that will 
provide compulsion is necessary. As for this compulsion, it opens up the 
way for the second function of mulk: making your demands happen by 
force. In this sense mulk, in sequence, is wrath, attack, protection, 
community, asabiyyah, and in the case of leadership it is a state that 
contains force, and is the aim of the human self and thus of asabiyyah. 
                                                 
6 Ibn Khaldûn, Muqaddimah, p. 124. 
7 Ibn Khaldûn, Muqaddimah, p. 47, 10. 
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In other words, the one who has asabiyyah, when he reaches a certain 
level desires chieftainship (riyasah, suûdet) and suzerainty (metbûah); 
and afterwards sorrow (qahr) and tyranny (taghallub). When reaching 
sorrow and tyranny there is no new aim to reach; the aim consists of the 
protection of the status quo 
.8 (ﺭﻬﻘﻟﺎﺑ ﻡﻛﺣﻟﺍﻭ ﺏﻠﻐﺗﻟﺍ ﻭﻬﻓ ﻙﻠﻣﻟﺍ ﺎﻣﺃﻭ) 
Because, when you carefully look at the process of the formation of 
mulk, it is seen that at the same time it also means the continuation of 
human existence and communities. Because of this, according to Ibn 
Khaldūn, mulk is the natural sentiment, and its realization is not related 
to the choices of human beings, on the contrary, the existence of 
society in a certain process necessarily reaches mulk and continues with 
mulk.9 This is what it means by the final form of human society being 
mulk. With this understanding, with all its stages, the concept of mulk is 
equal to the concept of the state (dawlah), and forms the advanced 
version of civilization (umrân). 
 
Ibn Khaldūn makes clear that mulk is based on two foundations. The 
first one is shawkah (meaning sanctionary power) and asabiyyah. The 
concrete demonstration of this is the army. As for the second one, it is 
property that provides the continuation of the existence of those things 
that the army and mulk need.10 This can be called treasure. In this case 
the substance of mulk corresponds to the entirety of what the owner of 
mulk is in possession of. In other words, all material and spiritual assets 
that can be thought of in the context of army and finance constitute the 
substance of mulk. In this regard mulk belongs to a private or legal 
person who has a subject, collects taxes, sends envoys, protects the 
borders, and has no ruling (kâhir) power above it. If asabiyyah fails to 
                                                 
8 Ibn Khaldûn, Muqaddimah, p. 30. 
9 Ibn Khaldûn, Muqaddimah, p. 139, 189. 
10 Ibn Khaldûn, Muqaddimah, p. 269. 
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provide some of these aspects it indicates that the reality of mulk has 
not been completed.11 If attention is paid, the mentioned situations at 
the same time also express the field of influence of asabiyyah that holds 
mulk in its hand. Thus, the owner of mulk can only execute his 
judgment over those who count as subjects and tax-payers in those 
territories where the borders are protected. In this regard state and 
mulk are in the position of the form of civilization (umrân), as for 
subjects (reaya), cities, and other elements they are in the position of 
substance.12 Thus, state and mulk are things that protect the kind of 
civilization and are not possible to detach from its substance. This 
means: as unimaginable state and mulk are without civilization (umrân), 
similarly impossible (muteazzir) is a civilization without state and mulk, 
because of the nature of the human beings.13 Because the forceful rule 
that is the reality of mulk is a characteristic that is present with the 
ruling person or persons, it becomes a realized meaning between the 
rulers and ruled. Thus the continuation of mulk does not mean merely 
the continuation of one party but of both parties. Said differently, while 
the continuation of the existence of society is dependent on the 
continuation of mulk or state, similarly the continuation of existence of 
state and mulk is dependent on the continuation of society. If that is the 
case, in order to maintain the existence of civilization (umrân) there 
must be found an element which is related to both mulk and the 
substance of mulk, and an element that pr ovides the protection of both. 
 
In order to find out what this element is Ibn Khaldūn starts from the theory of 
substance and form (madde-sûrah). According to the theory the formation and 
deterioration of bodies (kewn and fesâd) consists of the fact that materials are taking a 
                                                 
11 Ibn Khaldûn, Muqaddimah, p. 175-76. 
12 Ibn Khaldûn, Muqaddimah, p. 343. 
13 Ibn Khaldûn, Muqaddimah, p. 349. 
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different and new form. If a form (sûrah) corresponds to the essence of the object, the 
object that loses the unity of its form is no longer that object and turns into something 
else. The deteriorated form, if it is not from the essence of the object but from one of 
the accidents, aside from the object continuing as itself, it becomes subject to 
quantity, quality, or one of the other accident categories in which movement is 
realized. As for this movement, it consists of a change of the form of accident or body. 
When we think about civilization (umrân) as an identity that consists of substance and 
form, the form that protects its varietal unity is the mulk of it. However, since tyranny 
and sorrow that form the reality of mulk are the result of the strength of animal wrath, 
mulk in a bare state becomes arbitrary domination. With the words of Ibn Khaldūn, that 
the person or group who possesses mulk “forces the people according to their 
personal desires and often asks of them beyond their capacity” concretely entails that 
civilization, depending on the conditions, in a long or short period falls into decay. 
Because the forceful power that facilitates the continuation of rule, used by one of the 
two parties for their own benefit, obstructs the continuing of both the verdict caused 
by the form - because the interests change according to the person or group - and 
also it damages the substance that is the carrier of the form and in that way obstructs 
the continuation of the existence of the form. In this case the nature of mulk, because 
of being itself during the process it will lead to chaos and destruction, tends to destroy 
itself.14 This situation sometimes leads to the destruction of the reign of a specific 
leader (particular state) and sometimes, along with the asabiyyah that is the protector 
of the mulk, of the complete state (universal state), which means the destruction of 
civilization (umrân) in the real sense.15 
 
Thus the nature mulk in a bare state is not convenient to be enduring and there is a 
need for an element which will protect the relation between the substance and form of 
civilization and that will maintain it. So according to Ibn Khaldūn this element is the 
political law which forms the reality of umrân and takes into account the interests of 
both sides and which acquires general acceptance. When a state lacks such a law it 
cannot be said that its affairs are in order and its sovereignty has been fulfilled, which 
means it is not a true state.16 
                                                 
14 Ibn Khaldûn, Muqaddimah, p. 177. 
15 Ibn Khaldûn, Muqaddimah, p. 349. 
16 Ibn Khaldûn, Muqaddimah, p. 177. 
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In this context Ibn Khaldūn’s analysis of the continuity of umrân is based on two 
concepts: interest (maslahat) and law (qanun). Ibn Khaldūn uses the concept of interest 
as the opposite of the aim (gharaz) and desire (shahwah) of an individual or group. 
Maslahat in this sense means the societal interest that provides the continuation of 
civilization (umrân). The rules which are implemented to acquire these interests and to 
remove the negative consequences that obstruct these interests form the law. Interest 
and law, since they are states that are additional to the bare nature of mulk, Ibn 
Khaldūn calls “mulks” (plural of mulk) that rule people according to their own aims and 
desires and which are devoid of interests and laws “natural mulk” (tabiî mulk). And the 
mulks that rule the people according to the established rules with the aim of acquiring 
the interests and fence of the negative consequences he refers to according to the 
principle that determines the interest. Ibn Khaldūn’s division of interest is especially 
based on the knowledge and science classification of the late theologians (kelamiyyun) 
and philosophers. And also it is parallel to the analysis in the last part of the 
Muqaddimah that is about the sources of knowledge. According to this, if the interests 
are worldly interests that are identified by absolute reason without taking into account 
religious obligations and if the laws are based on these interests this is called political 
mulk. The aim of this mulk is to rule the people in accordance with reason-based 
thinking. If these interests in the real sense are otherworldly interests and the worldly 
interests are catered towards otherworldly interests and are determined according to 
them this form of rule is caliphate (khilafah). And the aim of this mulk is to rule the 
people in accordance with “legal thinking” In contrast to political mulk, the caliphate 
entails that the conditions in the world are determined in relation to the otherworldly 
interests in accordance with the lawgiver (Shâri’), which in reality means the caliphate 
is practiced on behalf of the lawgiver in protection of religion and the world.17 
 
So Ibn Khaldūn’s analysis of the nature of mulk shows that there are two essential 
conditions for the full realization of this nature. Firstly, that the external factor which 
functions as a sanctionary power possesses the characteristic of using force. Secondly, 
that the using of force and sanctionary power are applied along with laws that are 
implemented in relation to worldly interests or both worldly and otherworldly interests. 
It is possible to add to these two conditions a third condition of which Ibn Khaldūn is 
speaking in his analysis of the period of the first four caliphs: the gaining of interests 
                                                 
17 Ibn Khaldûn, Muqaddimah, p. 178. 
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and defeating the harms in the matter of sanctionary power, without the need of 
letting the external actors use force, the individuals don’t have conscientious 
objection. Thus, the santionary power that forces the person to act in accordance with 
the interests are external actors outside of the person.18 Because beside the fact that in 
such a situation the first condition of mulk remains dysfunctional - which is the 
condition that ensures that chairmanship (riyasah) shifts to the stage of mulk - the 
laws that were orders turn into actual advices. This condition shows that there is no 
coherence between state and mulk: as all mulks are a state, not all states are mulk. 
Although there is a real state in the first period of Islam there is no fully formed mulk. 
However Ibn Khaldūn thinks that this is because of exceptional circumstances in 
human history and when these possible exemptions are not taken into account mulk 
and state are indeed coherent. Because according to Ibn Khaldūn our experience of 
human relationships in general shows us that people, such as in the period of the first 
caliphs, apart from exceptional periods, do not obey laws voluntarily but because of 
the command and following up of the establisher of laws. Governance that does not 
carry any of these three characteristics is a governance in which the nature of mulk is 
realized incompletely and yet in the process of maturation. In that case these three 
characteristics are characteristics that form the essence and nature of mulk and 
possess them because of being itself. 
 
The concept of mulk with these characteristics assumes that the societal and political 
processes because of its essence are conflicting. The person or persons who possess 
or carry mulk are those that because of their asabiyyah have come out of this process 
of conflict successfully. In this case the direct result that emerges from mulk is that the 
carriers of mulk take the other under control and dominance. If “taking under control” 
can be taken as rulership, then the first and foremost thing that mulk brings to its 
carriers is rulership. At the beginning of possessing mulk in the understanding of 
dominance with suffering, rulership is a collective capacity and success amongst the 
military powers of asabiyyah. But this, as opposed to assumptions of contemporary 
theories that see rulership as collective capacity and success, is not based on that 
societal and political relations are at least possibly in harmony, rather it is based on 
                                                 
18 According to this, the nature of mulk wasn’t completely formed during the four caliphs period. In this 
period the sanction was religious and everyone’s sanction power originated from themselves. On the other 
hand, after the time of Muawiyya asabiyyah inclined towards mulk with purpose, the religious sanction 
weakened and for this reason “sultanic” and “asbani” sanction were needed. See Muqaddimah, 196. 
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continuous conflict. The leader of asabiyyah, who is possessing mulk and therefore is 
in the state of being the primary carrier of mulk, while destroying the asabiyyah during 
the process tends towards monopolizing the leadership. When asabiyyah that provides 
the earning of mulk is destroyed then mulk concentrates in one person. This situation 
that is called “infirâd” by Ibn Khaldūn is called the zero sum by contemporary 
sociologists, and reaches the peak of asymmetry which is from the realization onwards 
a basic characteristic of mulk. But “infirâd” needs amongst the carriers of the nature of 
mulk mutual relativity, and therefore does not give the possibility to gather the 
monopoly into one hand. Yet, when mulk reaches the stage of ‘infirâd’, the rulership of 
the owner of mulk, beside of the characteristics of taking under control of the others, 
it develops some kind of dependency relationship with the now occurring recruiting 
asabiyyah. In other words, while recruiting asabiyyah, because its interests dependent 
on the owner of mulk, serve his will and interest, the owner of mulk, because of his 
interests depending on the recruiting asabiyyah ‘will fulfil their wishes’. 
 
As this dependency strengthens the power to control or, despite the resistance, the 
power to fulfil his own wish will weaken. To the extent that the control is weakened, 
rulership turns into a capacity that is divided amongst the bearers of mulk. But in any 
case rulership holds the feature of inequality in gaining resources that are counted as 
worthy for the bearers of mulk as well as for the all segments of society. In this 
context, the basic element of rulership that emerges as a necessity of the nature of 
mulk is the realization of a wish or aim. So rulership in the understanding of Ibn 
Khaldūn is a purposeful rulership. The bearer of rulership is whether an individual who 
monopolized mulk or individuals who came together for specific purposes. The ability 
to make decisions that direct the flow of events and control capital is the most 
important consequence of mulk and therefore of rulership. In this case there must be 
an observable conflict so that mulk and rulership can gain existence. In this stage, 
authority, in the understanding of ‘fulfilling the desires of the person of group that 
poses mulk by subjects’, is authority that emerges through imposition and is 
essentially a result of rulership. Therefore, in the mulk that is based on asabiyyah 
before recruiting asabiyyah, the autority the mulk owner has over the subjects is a 
derivative of rulership. The authority the mulk-owner has over his subjects, in this 
stage, is not a derivative of of rulership that comes out of mulk. Because mulk was not 
gathered in one person before the formation of recruiting asabiyyah, the founding 
152 Ömer Türker
 
asabiyyah members claimed to have a right in mulk and therefore in rulership. When 
taken the formation process of mulk into consideration these claims are legitimate. 
Because in this stage the source of legitimacy in ‘the understanding of having right of 
mulk and iktidar’ is militant and victorious power of which the militant members of 
asabiyyah are gradually partners. 
 
On the other hand, the mulk being a relation between the ruler and the ruled, it needs 
the elimination of observable conflicts in order to maintain the existence of mulk and 
rulership. Because in the case of forceful sanctions mulk and rulership, to the extent 
that it serves the interests of a person or group, will tend to be destroyed. In that case, 
the carrier or carriers of rulership will gain continuity if they make their individual or 
group interests part of common social interests. This situation will transform the evil 
and aggressive way of mulk and rulership into good and reconciliatory and will make 
of mulk, through laws, the form of society in the real sense. The becoming of a unity 
of society and mulk consisting of substance and form influences the boundaries and 
sharing of rulership and authority deeply. First of all, the identity shaped by substance 
and form possesses some features independent from the bearers of rulership and 
authority which goes even beyond the purpose and will of a person who gathers mulk 
to himself. In other words, the specific features are the structural requirements that 
occur with conscious or unconscious actions of a particular individual or group within 
society. The spiritual beings which Ibn Khaldūn made the issues of the knowledge of 
society by speaking of them as symptoms that get attached to mulk because of its 
essence (of mulk), are almost all from these kinds of situations. These situations, 
which are requirement of the form, are the ones that are most difficult to be resolved 
because they gain reality in society through the actors. Because they contain many 
elements that make up the substance of society, as well as the individual and social 
contributions of the bearers. Therefore an attempt of resolution related to this requires 
an analysis of the separated features of substance and form as well as an analysis of 
the required situations of form regarding being a certain substance and the restrictions 
it becomes a topic for. 
 
In that case the gaining of real unity of the social existence through laws based on 
interests along with mulk, is an additional situation and privatization compared to 
previous situations, it is also the case for the bearers of mulk, rulership and authority. 
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Because in this case mulk is given in the service of interests. Although the degree of 
service among certain mulk-members is different this situation is adding some wilful 
(iradî) purposes, which aim for the continuation of society, to the natural aim of mulk; 
this situation leads to leaving attack for defence, conflict for serenity, sorrow for 
softness, relative barbarity for friendship. One of the most important consequences of 
this situation is the numerical expansion among the bearers of rulership in the 
meaning of ‘taking under control’ and the bearers of authority in the meaning of 
‘fulfilling the demands of another person or group’. Such numerical enlargement can 
be either through established institutions or through actual situations that are not fully 
institutionalized. Establishments are determined depending on interests and 
establishments which gain existence independent from its bearers to the extent it is 
necessary for the continuation of the nature of mulk, because they are carrying the 
nature of mulk in their own essence, they limit the rulership of the leader and assume 
a systemic character. In other words, because they are partners with the mulk-owner in 
fulfilling their wishes by using force, they function as ‘taking under control’ in their 
own boundaries. Since institutions represent the realization of interests, authority is 
shared amongst persons and groups who identify, enforce, and follow interests. The 
rulership in this situation loses its function to become a resource for authority to an 
important degree and the knowledge of interests, the application and the following 
becomes recourse for authority. Because private and legal rights are determined not by 
the capacity of using force and in this context the power of taking under control but by 
interests and laws. For this reason the legitimacy of rulership as a sustainable situation 
in political or ssher‘î mulk, different from natural mulk, is depending on interests and 
laws and is basically explained around the notion of justice. 
 
Here, Ibn Khaldūn sees this stage not in the terms of the human being an animal but 
as a stage in which the characteristics of him become more visible as being reasonable 
and thinking. Because, according to him, the qualities that maintain human beings as 
human beings are the good habits (hilâlü’l-khayr). Good habits are the complements 
of glory and honor which are an extension of asabiyyah. Since mulk is the purpose of 
asabiyyah its extensions and complements are also the purpose. Therefore even if the 
nature of mulk will be realized it will remain incomplete.19 These habits become more 
evident in individual and societal interests and situations and the so-called virtue 
                                                 
19 Ibn Khaldûn, Muqaddimah, p. 133-35. 
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arises. Mulk, rulership, and authority-owners start losing their positions to the extent 
that distance from these occurs. Because the realization of the nature of mulk, the 
attack and pretension that gain mulk to asabiyyah, in process, it transforms it to 
defense and protecting the currency. In this case, the emergence of luxury, comfort, 
and plentitude with the maturation of mulk, as long as it is not balanced by virtues, 
will destroy the foundations of mulk which is the form of society, and the process of 
the foundation of a new asabiyyah along with the starting of a new mulk.  
 
Analysis that has been made until now shows that Ibn Khaldūn thinks that mulk and 
rulership have no certain sociological form. When the concept of mulk is taken in the 
bare state as Ibn Khaldūn is calling it natural mulk and as a one-stage process, the 
theory of mulk turns into a theory that explains dynasties. Because, mulk in its bare 
state, because of its nature, goes toward solitary and requires the gathering of 
rulership in one person. But the transformations and the two basic stages of the mulk 
during the process show that this theory is special to dynasties. Because in this case it 
is possible to understand asabiyyah as the meaning that provides social solidarity and 
solitary as the centralization of rulership. The situation of “fulfilling demands by using 
force” that forms the nature of mulk and the transitions which rulership and authority 
that emerged from mulk are situations that can take place in all kind of regimes. When 
looked at from this perspective Ibn Khaldūn thinks of concepts like asabiyyah, tyranny, 
interest, and laws which form the roof of mulk as concepts that need mutual relativity 
on one hand and as concepts that in some situations have different degrees of 
realization on the other. In other words the human conditions the concepts in question 
are pointing out are concepts that need each other for the realization in the sphere of 
social existence as they are concepts that are possible to be understood through 
reference to each other. On the other hand the realization of these situations in the 
field of social existence, in final analysis, has no certain form or quantity. Anyone who 
wants to analyze the societal structure should before determining the form and 
quantity of spiritual beings in any society determine the existence of meaning or 
definition. This theory does not solely rely on the concept of rulership as a necessary 
consequence of human animal desires, on the contrary, it finds rulership and ultimate 
competence in the concept of justice by connecting the continuation of rulership to 
virtues that balances the animal desires. Moreover the virtues that Ibn Khaldūn lays 
down as a condition for the continuation of rulership or the perpetuity of the state, are 
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seen as the human conditions imposed by the continuity of the material existence of 
the state and of society. In other words, the form of social or political existence 
necessarily has to produce its own virtues. These virtues, which are moral values 
caused by the fact that the human is a thinking entity but not moral values because of 
the necessity of God’s commandments or moral values through which you reach 
metaphysical truths, but are universal principles that are the necessity of the 
continuation of material existence and in this sense necessitate being a social entity. 
 
B. The Metaphysical Foundations of the Theory of Mulk 
Ibn Khaldūn’s theory of mulk is based on the five principles of classical Islamic 
metaphysics, especially as seen in Ibn Sînâ. The first is the principle that the existence 
of man is the soul and body. The second is the principle that all objects consist of 
substance and form, and that the difference between the objects is realized by that the 
substance is taking new forms. The third is the distinction of being and essence that 
Ibn Sînâ has developed to explain essentially unity-plural relation. The fourth is 
Aristotelian teleology. According to this principle, everything in existence has a final 
goal and everything is in a movement to realize its own goal. This goal is at the same 
time also the competence of that thing. The fifth is the following principle, which is a 
general outcome of these principles: The competence of everything is contained in its 
definition, and any object can only be competent/maturation to the extent of its 
definition. Ibn Khaldūn’s success is that he is able to apply these principles to social 
existence, which is the subject of the science of society, in accordance with the 
hierarchy of philosophical sciences. But there are two basic determinations that 
introduce his application of which the first has to do with method and the second with 
the domain of existence. 
 
First of all, Ibn Khaldūn notices that there is no exact overlap between the 
philosophical sciences that are divided into two main parts, theoretical and practical, 
and the field of existence they commit to examine. As it is known, both Fârâbî and Ibn 
Sînâ begin to count philosophical sciences by dividing them into two things, one 
existing through human will and the other existing independently of human will. The 
things that exist through human will fall within the scope of practical knowledge 
consisting of morality, housekeeping and politics. These sciences too have two 
aspects, theoretical and practical. While in the theoretical part, the universal rules 
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related to the examined topics are determined and verified, in the practical part the 
wilful acts which must be done or avoided are determined and verified. For this reason, 
although the theoretical part is accepted as a part of practical sciences, it actually falls 
within the scope of theoretical sciences.20 According to Ibn Khaldūn, it seems that 
practical science, especially politics, is about human communities formed by human 
individuals together. However, it is clear that this is not the situation when it is 
examined more closely. Because it is very different to examine something in terms 
pertaining to something and being that thing. Political science examines how human 
societies should be governed. In this form, politics is a whole practical science in that it 
deals with society in the sense that it is a matter of governance, not of society. The 
same is valid for the oratorical science, which is a subdivision of the art of logic and 
consists of “persuasive words that make the public accept or reject any view”.21 Ibn 
Khaldūn says based on this consideration that there is a methodological difference 
between the science of society and politics and oratory because as the science of 
society is a science which aims to determine and analyze, the other two are normative 
sciences. But more important is the implicit consideration of Ibn Khaldūn of the fact 
that social existence in its bare state is not only unexamined but also unexplored at 
the same time in the political and oratorical sciences. For this reason, he felt the need 
to prove social existence which is the subject of the science of society. 
 
Ibn Khaldūn bases the existence of society on the traditional human definition of 
Islamic philosophers, that is to say, a “thinking creature”, which is the basis of the 
theory of umrân and mulk as a whole. Because while vitality is the source for the needs 
of human beings and their actions for the fulfılment of these needs, thinking is a 
source of human’s moral, political, and civilian values. This principle turns into a 
strong explanatory framework with the other assumptions listed above. According to 
this the definition in question expresses the human nature whose needs are 
unchanging because of being itself, although the subject and quantity changes 
according to individuals or even to societies. Ibn Khaldūn, in terms of functionalizing 
                                                 
20 For more information, see Fârâbî, Kitâbu’l-Burhân, trans. Ömer Türker – Ömer Mahir Alper, İstanbul: Klasik 
Yayınları, 2008, p. 48–51; İbn Sînâ, Kitâbu’ş-Şifâ Mantığa Giriş, trans. Ömer Türker, İstanbul: Litera Yayınları, 
2006, p. 5–9. 
21 For a more detailed information about Ibn Khaldun’s thoughts on this issue, see Ahmet Arslan, İbn 
Haldûn’un İlim ve Fikir Dünyası, p. 81-83; Şenol Korkut, “İbn Haldûn’un ‘es-Siyâsetü’l-medeniyye’ Teorisini 
Eleştirisi”, İslam Araştırmaları Dergisi, 15 (2006), p. 115-140. 
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this definition, by following the Ibn Sînâ’s line, he determines the essence and purpose 
of human according to this definition. Ibn Sînâ, before, had distinguished the necessity 
of existence and the necessity of essence by metaphysicizing the concept of 
beingessence, which was a logical distinction in the Aristotelian tradition, and 
reinterpreted the principle of causality and purposefulness in relation to this 
separation. Ibn Khaldūn also follows Ibn Sînâ’s trail and accepts the definition of 
human as his essence thus his unchanging essence and self. When this essence 
acquires reality outwardly, the gender and part (living and thinking) in this definition 
will become human’s substance and form. Although it is impossible for substance and 
form to gain existence without one another and to separate them from each other in 
the external world, each has its own requirements. As mentioned before, while the 
necessities of substance cause people’s coming together and the emergence of 
societal existence, the necessities of form show the situations that are attached to 
society because of being society. The substance-form theory states that the 
necessities of form are realized to the extent that substance is sufficient and take form 
depending on substance, and that the substance and form of any object are also 
determining its purpose and the boundaries of its competence. For example a seed of 
wheat carries the being of first a wheat seedling then the becoming of a wheat head, 
after that the transformation into ripe wheat grains in itself. 
 
These stages at the same time also express the purpose of seed and the competencies 
it can reach. These competences are the limits of its essence and it is not possible to 
cross these boundaries. A careful reader will notice that all the analyses in 
Muqaddimah concerning the spiritual situations of the society are made according to 
these principles. Just as all the competences of a grain of wheat are found in its own 
strength, all the competences of the human communities are included in the substance 
and the form of a human. These competences are, as far as material conditions allow, 
the purpose of human beings as individuals as well as of human societies. Since 
everything will course towards its substance and its competence in the extent that the 
reasons and circumstances that motivate the substance are sufficient, societies are 
moving towards the competencies contained in human definitions. Although the 
essential requirement of the substance is some kind of competence, the ultimate 
competence of the kind is to fulfil all the requirements of its form. In this context the 
ultimate competence of a society is the realization of the power of thinking of a 
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human, the spirit that is an abstract being, as precisely as possible. Thus, the fact that 
Ibn Khaldūn puts laws based on interests, sciences and arts at the end of improvement 
stage of mulk is caused by human societal experience and the interpretation according 
to his definition.22 Just as when a seed becomes a mature spike it completes its own 
purpose, when a society maturates to the extent that the substance is allowing to (or is 
sufficient), it will complete its own purpose and leave its place for another society. For 
this reason, Ibn Khaldūn’s understanding of history is not progressive but circular. Of 
course, it cannot be said that Ibn Khaldûn believes that all the competencies that the 
human spirit has, in an unrealized way, can be realized in a society. But he is well 
aware that even though the substance is passive, it is the only medium in which form 
can become competent. For this reason he thinks society and state are surrounded by 
natural borders just like an individual. Natural borders determine the amount of 
human kind’s competence that can occur in a given society. However, since natural 
boundaries are variable, considerations of a given state or society must be based on 
experiential data of the state or community. In other words, even if the analysis of the 
relation between substance and form of the society gives us the information of general 
situations that is expected to happen or in general a theoretical framework about the 
society, knowledge of the qualities and quantities specific to a society can be obtained 
by an experiential investigation. 
 
Conclusion 
The result from the above evaluations is as follows: In Khaldûn’s mind there is a 
theoretical frame isolated from a given time and place, in accordance with the essence 
theory of social existence. Because he assumes that the conceptual framework of the 
essence of society gives an analysis of nature and that attribute changes in a particular 
mulk and state that arise at any time and place will not cause any change in the 
essence. But to be satisfied only with the theoretical framework is to fall into a 
situation that Ibn Khaldūn criticizes philosophers about. Because the most creative 
aspect of Ibn Khaldūn’s philosophical readings is that he realized that the general 
concepts (el-umûr el-âmme) must be privatized according to certain materials, and 
that he has moved the metaphorical power of the metaphysic to the theory of society. 
                                                 
22 Furthermore, Ibn Khaldun’s remarks on the competence of human species lead to self-contradictions 
within the evaluation of especially kalam and philosophy and the calmness that he poses while analysing 
other conditions of mulk disappears when kalam-philosophy relationship is in question. 
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Thus Ibn Khaldûn has materialized pure rational accounts of possibility, necessity and 
impossibility specific to human communities. This situation gave him a general passing 
of human nature and society, and has allowed him to form a theoretical frame over 
time on the one hand, and on the other hand it shows that this theoretical framework 
can only function with experiential data on a given society. In other words, Ibn Khaldûn 
identifies the necessities, possibilities, and impossibilities of the propositions by 
starting from their substances. The provisions to be given for a specific society can 
only be determined by considering its substance.23 
 
His reliance on the concepts of nature and essence on the one hand and on the other 
hand to think that the truth and falsehood of the propositions, that is giving 
information about this nature and essence, are not being determined in terms of 
rational consistency but in terms of substance, gives Ibn Khaldūn both the possibility 
of establishing social existence as a matter of science and establishing the balance of 
stables and variables. In this context, the basic claim of Muqaddimah is that it is 
necessary to have a theoretical framework that overlaps the event of the society and 
the state in terms of being itself in order to make accurate analyses about a given 
society and state. Hence, what Ibn Khaldûn’s mulk theory promises us is an accurate 
analysis of society and state in terms of being itself. With no doubt, the theoretical 
framework which makes this analysis possible, does not lose the ability to identify and 
describe phenomena when abstracted from Ibn Khaldūn’s philosophical assumptions. 
Because, the identification and the representation of the phenomena are possible 
thanks to the questions which give priority to the philosophical assumptions. Even if 
we accept that the theory prioritizes observation, we can understand this in the 
meaning of what Ibn Sînâ said in Kitâbû’l-Burhân, that there is an overlap between the 
questions and the ones known by the questions.24 But in this case the theory loses its 
analytical power and basic claims to a significant extent. Because the concepts of 
nature, essence and purpose, as used by Ibn Khaldūn, are closed to progressiveness 
and evolutionism, and in this respect his theory separates from progressive and 
evolutionary theories of contemporary society. This is the essentialist side of the 
theory. On the other hand, when we refuse to distinguish the soul-body, Ibn Khaldūn’s 
                                                 
23 For Ibn Khaldun’s considerations of general concepts of metaphysics, see Ömer Türker, “The Perception of 
Rational Science in Muqaddima: Ibn Khaldun’s Individual Aptitutes Theory”, Asian Journal of Social Science, 
26 (2008), p. 471-72. 
24 Ibn Sînâ, Kitâbu’ş-Şifâ İkinci Analitikler, trans. Ömer Türker, İstanbul: Litera Yayıncılık, 2006, p. 201-209. 
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solutions about the spiritual situations of the society lose its importance and turn into 
simple observations. Because Ibn Khaldûn explains the social virtues, sciences, arts 
and phenomena like magic, prophecy, dream, revelation that arise in society, adhering 
to this principle. 
 
Science of society is, thanks to the essentialist and the dualist character, connected to 
the metaphysical traditions. It seems that the possibilities of alternative thinking that 
this theory has, is the dualistic side based on the assumption that the soul is, in 
particular, a rational matter. It is perhaps possible to reinterpret the concept of 
essence by considering contemporary criticism regarding essentialism. But if we 
abandon the existence of spirit and its being a rational matter it is not possible to 
make contact with post-Ghazālīan Islamic philosophy, poetry and mysticism, which 
especially Ibn Khaldûn is an heir of.  
 
